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A series of five studies examine potential consumer confusion associated with the
“percentage of profit” wording often used to describe cause-related marketing in which
money is donated to a charity each time a consumer makes a purchase. The initial four
studies demonstrate that (1) expressing the donation amount as a percentage of profit leads
to widespread confusion and near universal overestimation of the amount being donated,
(2) even consumers who have had formal accounting training are susceptible to this bias,
(3) participant motivation in an experimental setting cannot account for these results, and
(4) people report higher attitudes toward a company and express stronger purchase
intentions as a function of the percentage value of the donation but not as a function of
whether it is a percentage of profit or price. The authors conclude with a study that
explores several potential affirmative disclosures for the percentage-of-profit problem.
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C
ause-related marketing (CRM) is a promotional tech-
nique that enables a sponsoring firm to affiliate itself
with a charity by donating money that is “linked to
customers’ engaging in revenue-producing transactions with
the firm” (Varadarajan and Menon 1988, p. 60). Typically,
this is done by stating to consumers that some amount of
money will be donated to a charity each time a purchase of
the product is made. It is a rapidly growing form of promo-
tion that is expected to exceed $945 million in spending in
North America in 2003 (IEG 2002).
Previous CRM research suggests that the presence of
such promotions can have a beneficial impact on the way
consumers perceive advertisers (Ross, Patterson, and Stutts
1992) and that CRM influences their purchase decisions
(Pracejus and Olsen, in press; Webb and Mohr 1998).
Strahilevitz and Meyers’s (1998; see also Strahilevitz 1999)
research further suggests that under some conditions, most
people prefer that a company donate a portion of the price to
charity rather than reduce the price of the item.
If the amount donated through CRM were always stated in
a transparent, straightforward way, there would be little con-
cern about potential consumer confusion. Previous academic
research that examines the impact of CRM on brand choice
(e.g., Barone, Miyazaki, and Taylor 2000; Pracejus and
Olsen, in press; Strahilevitz 1999; Strahilevitz and Meyers
1998) has always presented participants with the actual
amounts being donated, expressed in absolute dollar terms.
However, transparency of donation amounts is far from uni-
versal in actual CRM practice. Casual observation suggests
that among the offerings, some are expressed as a percentage
of the sales price (a reasonably straightforward calculation),
others are expressed as a percentage of profits, and some are
expressed in completely vague terms (e.g., a portion of the
proceeds will be donated). Although other work has consid-
ered the use and impact of vague quantifiers in CRM (Prace-
jus, Olsen, and Brown, in press), this article focuses on the
distinction between two prevalent formats: percentage of
price and percentage of profit. A content analysis of CRM
offers on the Web has determined that both formats occur
with some frequency and that percentage-of-profit formats
are used more than five times as often as percentage-of-price
formats (Pracejus, Olsen, and Brown 2003).
Both formats may represent good-faith attempts to express
the amount being donated; however, they may not be equiv-
alent with respect to their ability to accurately convey this
amount. There is reason to believe that percentage-of-profit
formats are more problematic than percentage-of-price for-
mats. For example, some consumers may employ inappro-
priate estimation strategies. Note that requiring a consumer
to estimate on the basis of profit involves an extra mathe-
matical step than does calculating a percentage of the sales
price. Specifically, whereas the latter requires only one cal-
culation (i.e., x% of the price), the former requires an esti-
mation of the profit and a calculation of the donation amount
based on this value. Although we do not argue that con-
sumers are incapable of performing two operations, impos-
ing a second step adds to the complexity of the task and
expands the likelihood of error (i.e., assuming that for any
given operation performed there is some possibility of error).
It is well documented that people often take computa-
tional shortcuts, which can result in poor approximations of
true numeric values. For example, Eddy (1982) found that
95% of physicians, given all necessary information, esti-
mated posterior probabilities of breast cancer given a posi-
tive test result as between 70 and 90%, when the true prob-
ability was 7.8%. This order-of-magnitude error was largely
due to the physician sample’s ignoring or improperly using
one or more critical pieces of information. Similar findings
have been obtained for posteriors associated with other dis-
eases (Casscells, Schoenberger, and Graboys 1978; Ham-
merton 1973) and even the color of a taxi (Bar-Hillel 1980;
Tversky and Kahneman 1982). However, people’s inability
to make accurate calculations is not limited to complex,
probability-format Bayesian posteriors. For example, it has
been shown that many consumers engage in inappropriateJournal of Public Policy & Marketing 171
strategies when doing something as simple as determining
which of two packages has the lower price-per-unit weight
(Capon and Kuhn 1982).
Such biases, which are prevalent in calculation, have also
been observed in estimation. People have been shown to
engage in estimation strategies that may involve calculation
(Brown 2002b; Brown and Siegler 1993). In such cases, if
the calculation is biased, the resulting estimations also will
be biased. Beyond this, it is well documented that estimation
strategy selection can be restricted by (1) the availability of
task-relevant information and (2) the nature of task-relevant
information (Blair and Burton 1987; Brown 2002a). Previ-
ous research also shows that estimation bias is systemati-
cally related to strategy selection.
Because people often take computational shortcuts, it
seems likely that a small subset of the population skips the
step of estimating profit levels entirely. We refer to this pos-
sibility as the profit-equals-price (PEP) effect, which may
lead to drastic overestimation of the amount being donated
in a CRM campaign. For example, if a brand states that
“10% of the profit will be donated” and the profit level is
10%, this is equivalent to a “1% of price” donation level.
Given the PEP effect, a consumer would mistakenly calcu-
late 10% of the price, resulting in a donation estimate that
was off by an order of magnitude (i.e., ten times too high).
Even when people do take profit into consideration when
calculating the donation estimate, estimates of CRM donation
amounts can be quite poor. Because consumers do not typi-
cally know the actual profit level for an item, stating a dona-
tion as a percentage of profit is potentially confusing. This sit-
uation is more problematic because recent research has
demonstrated that consumers are inclined to overestimate
profits, often to an extreme extent (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba
2003). Consequently, by overestimating profits, consumers
may overestimate the amount being donated in a CRM cam-
paign. We refer to this as the profit-overestimation (PO) effect.
In addition, when the term “profit” is used, it is not clear
whether this refers to the gross profit (i.e., the retail price of
the item minus the price paid by the retail store to the sup-
plier for the item) or the net profit (i.e., profit after addi-
tional costs of doing business, such as rent for the retail
space, electricity, and payment of employees, are factored
in). The latter is necessarily less than the former. Indeed, if
a company refers to the net margin, it is possible that there
is no net profit (depending on the level of the costs and the
way they are allocated), even if gross profit is large. In such
cases, a CRM offer predicated on a percentage of profit will
result in no donation to charity whatsoever.
Although the frequency of “creative” accounting in CRM
is not known, anecdotal evidence points to its existence. In
2001, Oregon’s attorney general charged the operators of
“The Miracle of a Million Lights” with making bogus
claims that a portion of admission proceeds from an annual
Christmas light display would benefit charities. The opera-
tors responded by saying, “There was no profit, I don’t
think, any year. We’re not going to say we’re guilty,
because we’re not” (Hogan 2001, p. A1). Despite this rea-
soning, the owners agreed to pay a $31,200 settlement to the
charities involved. Specifically, Oregon Attorney General
Hardy Myers stated, “When a for-profit entity represents
that proceeds from an event or product sale will be donated
to charity, the law requires the entity to actually make the
donation” (Oregon Department of Justice 2001).
The issue of transparent portrayal of the actual amount
being donated has received additional attention from regula-
tors. For example, a consortium of 19 states’ attorneys gen-
eral issued “Draft Report on Cause Marketing” (State of
California, Office of the Attorney General 1999), which
specifically states, “Advertisements arising from all
corporate-nonprofit arrangements shall not mislead,
deceive, or confuse the public about the effect of con-
sumers’ purchasing decisions on charitable contributions by
the consumer or the commercial sponsor.” Thus, from a
consumer protection perspective, there is reason to believe
that any method of expression that could lead to the system-
atic overestimation of donation values would be of concern.
Because there are at least two theoretical mechanisms
(PEP and PO) by which consumers might overestimate
donation amounts when presented as a percentage of profit,
and because regulators have expressed concern about the
accurate portrayal of these amounts, we believe that the
investigation of the impact of different formats is an impor-
tant marketing and public policy issue. We present five stud-
ies to examine biases that might occur when donation infor-
mation is presented as a percentage of profit. The first four
studies demonstrate the following: (1) Expressing the dona-
tion amount as a percentage of profit leads to widespread
confusion and near universal overestimation of the amount
being donated, (2) even consumers who have formal
accounting training are susceptible to this bias, (3) partici-
pant motivation in an experimental setting cannot account
for these results (a $5 award for accurate estimates does not
improve estimation accuracy), and (4) people report higher
attitudes toward a company and stronger purchase intentions
as a function of the donation amount (1% versus 10%) but
not as a function of the term “profit” or “price” being used
as the base. We conclude by exploring several potential
affirmative disclosures for the percentage-of-profit problem
along a continuum that balances the potential for consumer
confusion with intrusiveness (see Mazis et al. 1981).
Study 1
The purpose of the initial study is threefold: (1) to indicate
whether expressing information as a percentage of price
leads to acceptable estimates and therefore whether it is a
suitable method of expression in and of itself, (2) to deter-
mine whether consumers understand the concept of profit,
and (3) to understand the nature of profit estimates provided
by participants and the extent to which this information is
incorporated into the donation estimates in percentage-of-
profit formats.
Experimental Design and Procedure
A total of 62 students in an introductory anthropology
course voluntarily participated in this study. We used a one-
way, two-level design, manipulating the type of offer pro-
vided to the respondents: 5% of profits and 5% of the retail
price. The experimental advertisement was for a fictitious
office equipment retailer (Office Warehouse) and featured a
photograph of a brand-name ink-jet printer for $149.96. The
printer and the sales price were based on an actual adver-
tisement for a comparable ink-jet printer featured at the172 Donation Amounts in Cause-Related Marketing
same price. We chose ink-jet printers because of their rele-
vance to the student sample. Specifically, we conducted
testing with a separate group of 33 undergraduate students.
A total of 66.7% of these participants had previously been
involved directly in the purchase of an ink-jet printer, and
84.8% of participants had purchased an ink-jet printer in the
past and/or intended to purchase one in the next two years.
In an effort to make the advertisement appear realistic,
several printer features were displayed in the advertisement
(i.e., 2400 × 1200 dpi resolution, enhanced color layering,
ability to print nine pages per minute, and inclusion of bonus
software). Furthermore, at the bottom of the advertisement,
we provided a statement about the donation policy that read:
“As part of our continuing commitment to the community,
[phrase explaining type of donation] will be donated to a
local charity.” The phrase was either “5% of the retail price”
or “5% of the profit from the sale of this item” (see Figure 1).
Participants were told that they would be given a news-
paper advertisement for Office Warehouse, a retailer that
was not yet present locally, and given one minute to view
the advertisement. After viewing the advertisement, they put
it in an envelope and were given a survey packet that began
with a two-minute filler task that asked about computer and
printer usage. On completion of the survey packet, partici-
pants provided a dollar estimate of how much would be
donated to charity for each printer sold. Participants then put
the survey in the envelope with the advertisement. A final
sheet was distributed, asking participants to indicate the
price of the printer and the amount of profit they believed
would be made each time a printer was sold.
Results
Given the retail situation we presented to respondents (i.e., a
tangible product that would have cost something to manu-
facture), 5% of profits must be less than 5% of price. Thus,
it is notable that we observed no estimation difference
between the profit condition (x   = $7.48, standard deviation
[s.d.] = 2.46) and the price condition (x   = $7.07, s.d. = 1.41,
t60 = .81, not significant [n.s.]). Indeed, the mean donation
estimate was nominally higher in the percentage-of-profit
condition, and both groups displayed a median estimate of
$7.50. For both groups, 58.1% (18 of 31) of participants pro-
1A national office-supply chain that is a member of a retail center associ-
ated with University of Alberta indicated that profit levels are kept extremely
low (less than 5%) on ink-jet printers in an effort to foster adoption. Profits
are then made on the sale of ink-jet cartridges. This profit strategy appears to
mimic that of ink-jet printer manufacturers, which also make only “single-
digit” profits on ink-jet printers (U.S. News & World Report 1999).
vided a donation estimate of exactly 5% of the price (i.e.,
$7.49 or $7.50). Further examination of the estimates reveals
that 64.3% of participants in the 5%-of-profit condition pro-
vided an estimate within $.50 of $7.49 (the actual value for
“5% of sales price”). This does not differ significantly (χ2
1 =
.68, n.s.) from the 5%-of-price condition in which 74.2% of
participants provided responses within this range.
A possible explanation is that participants did not com-
prehend the concept of profit; however, this does not appear
to be the case. When asked to estimate the level of profit on
the printer, 96.8% of participants in the 5%-of-profit condi-
tion correctly provided a profit level less than the reported
price, with a mean value of 43.91% (s.d. = 19.95). In the
percentage-of-price condition, 96.8% of participants also
provided a profit value less than zero, with a mean value of
49.59% (s.d. = 16.38). The groups did not significantly dif-
fer on this value (t60 = 1.21, n.s.)
To investigate further whether the “5% of profit” wording
was systematically misleading, we calculated a derived
donation estimate for participants in this group. As we noted
previously, all participants were asked to estimate the
amount of profit that they believed was made from each
printer. Thus, although the advertisement does not present
an objective value for the level of profit, individual assess-
ments were available. To obtain the derived estimate, we
multiplied each participant’s profit estimate by .05. Only
two participants (6.5%) in this condition had derived esti-
mates that were within $1 of their actual estimate. When this
is compared with the 74.2% of people in the 5%-of-price
condition whose estimates are within $1 of the true value of
$7.50, it can be said that the 5%-of-profit condition is sig-
nificantly more confusing for consumers (χ2
1 = 29.56, p <
.001) and possibly more misleading.
Discussion
An objective of this study was to examine the extent to
which expressing the donation as a percentage of price
results in an acceptable understanding of the amount
donated. Approximately 75% of the participants in this con-
dition correctly understood the amount donated to be $7.50
(i.e., $149.96 × .05), which suggests that the calculation is
doable. Furthermore, the average estimate was nominally
less than the actual amount (i.e., $7.50), though not signifi-
cantly different. The median amount was exactly $7.50 in
the percentage-of-price condition.
Another objective was to examine whether consumers
understand the concept of profit. When directly asked about
the concept, approximately 95% did. Although our partici-
pants would have no reason to know the actual profit level for
ink-jet printers, it is quite low.1 Given the somewhat unusu-
ally low profit level on this particular class of consumer elec-
tronics, it is perhaps instructive to consider the gross profit
margin for consumer electronics as a whole, which is approx-
imately 38% (Risk Management Association 2003).
Comparison of the profit value estimated by participants
(46.8%) even to the liberally high value of 38% demonstrates
Figure 1. Newspaper Advertisement Used in Studies
This Week’s
Special
■  2400 X 1200 dpi resolution
■  Enhanced colour layering
■  Prints 9 pages per minute
■  Includes PhotoProTM    software
OFFICE WAREHOUSE
$14996
As part of our continuing commitment to the community, 5% of the
profit from the sale of this item will be donated to a local charity.
Brand Name and Model
Number Placed HereJournal of Public Policy & Marketing 173
considerable profit overestimation (t68 = 3.98, p < .001).
Thus, regardless of whether net or gross profits are consid-
ered, our participants overestimated profit levels, thereby
replicating previous findings (Bolton, Warlop, and Alba
2003). Consequently, even if consumers correctly multiplied
their profit estimates by 5%, an inflated donation estimate
would still result. Thus, if participants in the percentage-of-
profit condition had actually used their estimates for profit, it
is likely that we would have observed a PO effect. However,
this point is moot because of the great number of our partic-
ipants who exhibited the PEP effect, which results from the
use of an incorrect mathematical method to estimate dona-
tion amounts (i.e., consumers bypass estimation and use the
price instead of the profit estimate). This conclusion is based
jointly on the following: (1) The vast majority of participants
appeared to understand the concept of profit and provided an
average value much less than 100%; (2) few participants in
the percentage-of-profit condition produced a donation esti-
mate that was close to the derived value of 5% of their profit
estimate; and (3) approximately 60% of participants in the
percentage-of-profit condition provided a value that was
identical to 5% of the sales price, a value that cannot be
accounted for by a calculation based on 5% of their profit
estimate. Stated differently, few people used the profit esti-
mate at all in the calculation of the donation amount. To bet-
ter understand this phenomenon, we set out to replicate and
extend Study 1, attempting to establish boundary conditions.
A possibility is that the effect is only obtained when a dis-
tracter task is imposed between ad exposure and estimation,
as we did in Study 1. Therefore, Study 2 participants were
required to make estimates immediately after exposure to the
advertisement. It is also possible that mistaking profit for
price was largely a function of participants’ lack of working
fluency with these terms. To test this, we selected partici-
pants in Study 2 from two populations, one of which had
some formal training in accounting.
Study 2
Experimental Design and Procedure
This study employed students in an introductory psychology
course (n = 81) and students in the third and fourth years of
an undergraduate business program (n = 61). None of the
psychology students in this study had completed an accounting
course, whereas the business students had all completed at
least two courses in accounting (financial and cost accounting).
The study manipulated the donation condition (5% of
profits versus 5% of the retail price) and employed a two-
level covariate regarding participants’ accounting knowl-
edge (no formal training versus some courses in account-
ing). The same advertisement used in Study 1 was also used
in this experiment. In contrast to Study 1, respondents pro-
vided their donation estimates immediately after viewing
the experimental advertisement. In addition, at the end of
the survey, respondents were asked to recall verbatim the
CRM donation phrase used in the advertisement. All other
dependent variables and procedures remained identical to
Study 1; the profit estimate and retail-price recall were
assessed after all other dependent variables.
Results
We conducted analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine
the impact of the phrase (i.e., profit versus price) and the
accounting knowledge covariate (i.e., participants dichoto-
mously scored as having or not having formal accounting
training) on donation estimates. Information about the dona-
tion estimates is provided in Table 1. The mean estimate was
$7.69 (s.d. = 3.07), and we did not find that it differs as a
function of price versus profit (F1, 137 = 1.40, n.s.), account-
ing knowledge (F1, 137 = .98, n.s.), or an interaction between
the two (F1, 137 = .19, n.s.). The mean donation estimate was
$7.42 (s.d. = 2.71) across the percentage-of-profit conditions
and $7.99 (s.d. = 3.40) across the percentage-of-price condi-
tions. Note that the mean for the percentage-of-profit condi-
tions is approximately 5% of the retail price ($7.50). Further
examination of estimates reveals that 69.4% of the estimates
in the percentage-of-profit conditions are within $.50 of
$7.50, compared with 65.7% in the percentage-of-price con-
ditions. Indeed, 51.4% of participants in the percentage-of-
profit conditions estimated either $7.49 or $7.50. In the
percentage-of-profit conditions, only five participants (6.9%)
were within $1.00 of their derived estimate.
If we examine the deviation of estimates from values
based on 5% of the sales price and 5% of the profit estimate
of each participant, or “calculated values,” for the price and
profit conditions respectively, we again find significantly
poorer estimates for the percentage-of-profit format
(F1, 137 = 40.83, p < .001). We found that neither the main
effect for accounting training (F1, 137 = .401) nor the two-
way interaction (F1, 137 = .016) was significantly different.
For the percentage-of-profit conditions, participants over-
estimated the value of the donation by an average of $4.20
(s.d. = 3.31), which is significantly different from zero (t70 =
10.69, p < .001). However, participants in the percentage-
of-price condition nominally underestimated the calculated
value by $.49 (s.d. = 3.40), which is not significantly differ-
ent from zero (t68 = 1.19, n.s.).
In the percentage-of-profit conditions, 95.8% of partici-
pants reported profit estimates less than the retail price, simi-
lar to the value in the percentage-of-price conditions (97.1%),
which again suggests that failure to estimate 5% of profit cor-
rectly was not driven by a failure to understand the word
“profit” per se. The implications of this are striking, suggest-
ing that people with and without formal accounting training
fail to observe the price/profit distinction at the time of read-
ing or do not make the connection at the time of estimation.
To gain deeper insight into the underlying process, we
conducted additional analysis. After training, two partici-
pants, blind to treatment condition and hypotheses, were
given the actual verbatim donation phrases recalled by each
respondent. The phrases were randomized so as not to con-
found treatment condition and order of evaluation by the
coders. The vast majority of respondents (96%) provided
some description of the offer. Each phrase was coded for
donation type; specifically, each phrase was designated as
belonging to one of five categories: 5% of profit, 5% of sales,
5% but no base (e.g., 5% is donated to charity), other, and no
answer. Initial intercoder agreement was 92%. Differences
were resolved through discussion and mutual agreement
between the coders. Results are presented in Table 1.
With respect to recalling 5% of price in the 5%-of-price
condition, participants with accounting knowledge (61.3%)
and participants with low accounting knowledge (66.7%)
were equally good. They were also equally bad at correctly
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Table 1. Study 2: Mean Estimate and Phrase Recall by Expertise and Donation Type
High Accounting Knowledge Low Accounting Knowledge
Percentage- Percentage- Percentage- Percentage-
of-Profit of-Price of-Profit of-Price
Condition Condition Condition Condition
(n = 30) (n = 31) (n = 42) (n = 39)
Donation Estimate Measures
Mean estimate $6.98 $7.83 $7.73 $8.12
Median estimate $7.12 $7.50 $7.50 $7.50
Standard deviation $2.23 $4.00 $2.99 $2.87
Profit Estimate Measures
Mean estimate 41.25 48.20 41.21 41.07
Median estimate 33.44 46.68 40.00 33.34
Standard deviation 18.19 17.88 20.28 26.85
Donation Policy Recalled
5% of profits 13.3 9.7 9.5 2.6
5% of sales price 56.7 61.3 64.3 66.7
5% but no base 16.7 25.8 23.8 15.4
Other 10.0 3.2 2.4 7.7
No response 3.3 .0 .0 7.7
Calculated Value Accuracy
Correct estimatea 6.7 67.7 2.4 64.1
∆ from derived estimate $3.94 $–.33 $4.38 $–.62
Correct recall of priceb 90.0 93.5 90.5 84.6
Understanding of “profit”c 96.7 96.7 95.2 97.4
aBased on estimate being within $.50 of derived estimate.
bBased on estimate being within $1.00 of actual.
cDefined by provision of profit estimate that was lower than the retail price.
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, figures are given as percentages.
tion (13.3% versus 9.5%; χ2
1 = .26, n.s.). An explicit com-
parison within each group can also be made. In the high-
accounting-knowledge group, those in the 5%-of-price con-
dition were better at recalling the correct phrase than were
those in the 5%-of-profit condition (χ2
1 = 14.93, p < .001).
The same was true for the low-accounting-knowledge group
(χ2
1 = 28.32, p < .001). Consequently, both groups were bet-
ter able to correctly recall percentage of price than percent-
age of profit. However, there is substantial evidence that
participants did pay attention to the advertisement: Approx-
imately 90% correctly recalled the purchase price, and 93%
were able to provide some coherent statement about the
donation offer (i.e., they remembered one or more of the
points in the CRM offer correctly).
Discussion
As in Study 1, results suggest that most participants who
were asked to estimate a percentage of profit mistakenly cal-
culate a percentage of price. Formal accounting training
does not improve the results. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate
that people mistakenly calculate percentage of price when
they are told that a percentage of profit will be donated.
However, it is possible that experimental subjects lacked
the motivation to process the information at a level necessary
to notice the difference between price and profit. If partici-
pants in our experiments pay less attention than do consumers
in a more natural setting, our results can be called into ques-
tion. To rule out this possibility, Study 3 explores estimation
accuracy when a monetary incentive is used to improve moti-
vation to process information. This is an extremely conserva-
tive test, as such an incentive will likely create a motivation
to process, which exceeds that of typical consumers. How-
ever, if a significant number of participants still estimate 5%
of price instead of 5% of profit, we will have strong evidence
of a real potential for consumer confusion (and overestima-
tion) associated with the percentage-of-profit format.
Study 3
Experimental Design and Procedure
Twenty-nine students in a psychology course participated for
the opportunity of a $5 award for accurately answering ques-
tions about an advertisement. Participants were told that they
would be given one minute to view an advertisement and that
they would then be asked three questions about the adver-
tisement. They were told that if they answered all three ques-
tions correctly, they would be given $5. All participants were
given the 5%-of-profit advertisement used in the first two
studies. After viewing the advertisement for one minute, they
placed it into an envelope and were given the three questions:
(1) “According to the ad you just saw, each time a [brand
name] is sold, an amount of money will be donated to char-
ity. How much money will the Office Warehouse donate to
charity for each Cannon S400 printer sold (Please express as
a numerical value.)?” (2) “What is the price of the printer?”
and (3) “How many pages per minute does the printer print?”
As in Study 2, participants were then asked to recall the
donation phrase and to estimate the Office Warehouse’s
profit on the sale of each printer.
Results
The $5 incentive was quite successful in motivating partici-
pants to process the information in the advertisement. Of 29Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 175
participants, 27 correctly recalled the page-per-minute rate
as 9, and 28 of 29 correctly recalled the price as $149.96.
However, only 3 of 29 estimated the amount donated as less
than $7.49 (for purposes of remuneration, we considered
any value less than $7.49 a “correct” answer). Therefore, it
appears that 89% of participants based their estimates on 5%
of the sales price, not 5% of the profit (given that profit must
be less than price for the type of product advertised). Com-
pared with the percentage-of-profit conditions in previous
studies, it appears that the $5 incentive to process the infor-
mation carefully actually made estimates worse. That is, the
89% of participants who exhibited the PEP effect in Study 3
is significantly higher than the 51.9% who exhibited the
effect in Study 2’s percentage-of-profit condition (χ2
1 = 12.9,
p < .001) and the 58.1% who exhibited the effect in Study 1
(χ2
1 = 7.65, p < .01). The 89% of participants who made this
mistake (26 of 29) in Study 3 is also significantly different
from zero (χ2
1 = 47.13, p < .001).
Three people were within $1 of the derived estimate (i.e.,
5% of their estimate of profit); however, it appears that these
people also used sales price as a basis for calculation but had
reasonably close estimates because they believed that prof-
its on the $150 product were in excess of $142. The average
profit estimate including these three participants was $81.47
(s.d. = 35.40); it was $73.25 (s.d. = 27.94) excluding these
participants. Note that two participants did not provide esti-
mates for profit and were not included in the calculations.
An examination of the donation phrases recalled indicates
that 11 of the 29 (38%) participants correctly recalled that
the donation was 5% of profits, 5 (17%) incorrectly recalled
5% of price, 11 (38%) indicated 5% but did not provide a
base, and 2 did not provide a response.
Discussion
In Studies 1 and 2, it is possible that participants were less
motivated to process the ad information than consumers
would be in real purchase environments. However, the same
criticism cannot be made of Study 3, because people were
offered a $5 incentive to answer questions about the adver-
tisement correctly. Participants in this study paid careful
attention to the advertisement, as is evidenced by the near
universal recollection of the price and the page-per-minute
rate of the printer. Despite the careful attention achieved by
the monetary incentive, 89% of participants erroneously cal-
culated 5% of the purchase price when asked to estimate 5%
of the profit. This rate is significantly higher than the error
rate in Studies 1 (58.1%) and 2 (51.4%). Giving people
incentive to carefully process the ad information made the
PEP effect problem considerably worse.
Just as the results cannot be explained in terms of dili-
gence, they cannot be explained by the inability of partici-
pants to notice the phrase. When asked to write down the
phrase about the donation, approximately 40% recalled that
the donation amount was 5% of the profit, and only 17%
mistakenly recorded 5% of the price. Thus, an explanation
based on a failure to notice the term “profit” does not
explain why at least 40% of the participants did not report a
value different from the 5% of price calculation. Further-
more, as is noted in previous studies, people do seem to have
some understanding of the concept of profit when specifi-
cally asked to think about it. In this study, 97% provided
profit estimates less than the retail price.
Thus far, we have demonstrated that expressing CRM
donations as a percentage of profit leads to widespread con-
fusion and systematic overestimation of the amount being
donated. However, it is not known whether the format used
(percentage of price versus percentage of profit) affects tradi-
tional persuasion measures, such as attitude toward the ad,
attitude toward the brand, and purchase intention. Several
possibilities exist. First, a backlash effect is possible; that is,
although percentage-of-profit formats result in overestimation
of donation amounts, they signal that some sort of accounting
“trick” is being deployed. Such a backlash effect would be in
line with research on tensile price claims (e.g., up to 70% off),
which suggest that increasing ambiguity results in decreased
valuation of the advertised information (e.g., Biswas and Bur-
ton 1993; Mobley, Beardon, and Teel 1988). Darley and
Smith (1993) also demonstrate that perceived objectivity/ver-
ifiability of the information presented in an offer may have an
impact on the credibility associated with the brand, which
may in turn affect brand perceptions and purchase intentions.
This logic suggests that the percentage-of-profit formats
result in lower attitudes and purchase intentions than do
percentage-of-price formats (because the former is more
ambiguous and less verifiable than the latter).
A second possibility, in line with estimation findings to
this point, would be that consumers do not make a funda-
mental distinction between profit and price and therefore
produce elevated donation estimates in the former case.
These upwardly biased estimates, in turn, may have a posi-
tive impact on attitudes and intentions (i.e., enhancement). In
such a condition, it might be expected that attitudes are influ-
enced by the percentage amount associated with a donation,
not by the profit/price distinction. Third, it is possible that
neither the percentage value associated with the donation nor
the format affects these measures. Study 4 uses a between-
subjects experiment to examine these three possibilities.
Study 4
Experimental Design and Procedure
A total of 133 students in an undergraduate introductory
marketing course participated in this study. We employed a
2 × 2 factorial between-subjects design, manipulating the
percentage associated with the donation (1% versus 10%)
and the type of donation (percentage of profit versus per-
centage of price). The experimental advertisements and
viewing conditions were similar to those that we used in
previous studies. After viewing one of the four advertise-
ments, participants responded to a series of statements about
Office Warehouse on a seven-point scale anchored by
“strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7). The state-
ments were as follows:” Overall, I have a positive attitude
toward the Office Warehouse ad”; “Overall, I have a posi-
tive attitude toward Office Warehouse”; and “If Office
Warehouse comes to my city, I will buy from them.”
Results
Table 2 presents mean values by condition and multivariate
ANOVA results. For all three statements, perception varied
as a function of the amount of the donation. The 10% con-
dition resulted in higher evaluations than the 1% condition
for attitude toward the ad (5.01 versus 4.55), attitude toward
the brand (4.94 versus 4.38), and purchase intention (4.41
versus 3.88). However, the phrase (i.e., profit or price) asso-176 Donation Amounts in Cause-Related Marketing
Table 2. Study 4: Estimates and Attitude Measures by Condition
Mean Evaluation by Conditiona
Percentage of Profit Percentage of Price Analysis of Variance (F-value)
1% 10% 1% 10% Phrase (P)  Amount (A) P × A 
(n = 34) (n = 34) (n = 32) (n = 33) Main Effect Main Effect Interaction
Overall, I had a positive attitude  4.41 5.03 4.69 5.00 .26 9.26* 1.00
toward the Office Warehouse  (1.04) (.64) (.61) (.81)
advertisement.
Overall, I have a positive attitude  4.26 4.85 4.50 5.03 2.03 14.92* .04
toward Office Warehouse. (.87) (.49) (.65) (.78)
If Office Warehouse comes to my city,  3.79 4.53 3.97 4.30 .03 12.02* 1.69
I will buy from them. (1.02) (.74) (.93) (.47)
Overall MANOVA Modelb .79 6.96* .86
(3, 127) (3, 127) (3, 127)
aMean of seven-point scale anchored by 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” Variance is reported in parentheses under the mean.
bValues for effects are Wilks’ lambda; hypotheses degrees of freedom and error degrees of freedom are reported in parentheses beneath.
*p < .001.
ciated with the donation had no impact, either directly or in
interaction, on any dependent variables.
Recall that in this particular category (ink-jet printers)
profits are less than 10% (i.e., “single digits”). As a result,
$1.50 is the highest donation amount to which “10% of the
profits” could refer. This is the same amount as 1% of the
price. To test whether these numerically equivalent state-
ments (in terms of donation amount) lead to different atti-
tudes and intentions on the part of consumers, we performed
a contrast between the two cells. Although attitude toward
the ad (t64 = 1.76, p < .10) and attitude toward the brand
(t64 = 1.90, p < .10) show only marginal superiority for the
10%-of-profit condition, this format results in significantly
superior performance for purchase intention (t64 = 2.49, p <
.05). Thus, it appears that stating donation amount as a per-
centage of profit rather than a percentage of price can result
in enhanced consumer response.
Discussion
This study explores whether the percentage-of-profit format
leads to backlash or enhancement. We found no evidence for
backlash. Although subjects responded more favorably to
CRM offers involving 10% than 1%, we found no differences
for whether this percentage was of price or profit. Therefore,
it appears that though higher donation percentages can affect
attitudes and intentions, the price/profit distinction does not.
However, we did find evidence of enhancement. Partici-
pants who were told that 10% of the profits would be donated
reported significantly higher purchase intentions than did
participants who were told that 1% of the price would be
donated. We admit that our participants had no way of know-
ing the profit level for ink-jet printers. Our point is that in a
low-margin product category, stating the same $1.50 dona-
tion as a percentage of profit can result in higher purchase
intentions than presenting it as 1% of price. Although the
current study cannot determine whether this is due to the PO
effect or the PEP effect, given the overwhelming PEP effect
in Studies 1–3, we suspect that the PEP effect operates in this
case. Regardless of whether it is caused by either effect, the
format used can affect consumer purchase intentions. We
believe this is evidence of an enhancement effect associated
with percentage-of-profit formats.
The Federal Trade Commission (1983) notes that three
conditions must be present to satisfy conditions for decep-
tion: (1) The practice must be likely to mislead consumers;
(2) the ability to mislead consumers is examined from the
perspective of reasonable consumers in the group targeted;
and (3) the practice must be material, thereby influencing
consumers’ decisions. Studies 1–3 seem to establish the first
two principles. Furthermore, failure to consider the term
“profit” may lead to misperceptions of the amount donated,
which this study suggests may affect purchase intentions. It
is possible that the failure to describe the profit levels more
fully results in confusion and therefore may speak to the
need for some form of affirmative disclosure. As Mazis and
colleagues (1981, p. 15) note, “First Amendment cases sup-
port the proposition that remedies should keep the flow of
commercial information as ‘clean’ as possible without
unduly restricting total information flow.” They further
indicate that information remedies vary with respect to their
restrictiveness, from the removal of restraints on informa-
tion flow (e.g., eliminating constraints on some advertising
practices) to the enhancement of information flow (e.g., pro-
viding additional information) and the restriction of infor-
mation flow (e.g., banning certain statements).
Therefore, the goal of Study 5 is to examine how the
overestimation of donation might be reduced, short of elim-
inating percentage-of-profit formats altogether. This is
worthwhile because an outright ban (i.e., the most restrictive
remedy) on a legally definable phrase such as “percentage
of profit” is unlikely. Specifically, Study 5 explores whether
affirmative disclosures can reduce the miscomprehension
rate associated with percentage-of-profit formats (for a dis-
cussion and use of disclosure statements to remedy the mis-
interpretation of advertising information, see Andrews,
Netemeyer, and Burton 1998). Several options are consid-
ered, ranging from simply defining profit to providing
explicit information about profit levels.Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 177
Study 5
Experimental Design and Procedure
This study employed 137 students participating for research
credit in an introductory marketing course. Participants were
shown one of four advertisements identical to those used in
the previous studies, with the exception of the phrase pre-
sented. All advertisements included the phrase “5% of the
profit from this product will be donated to charity.” To
explore potential affirmative disclosures that might mitigate
consumer overestimation of donation amount in percentage-
of-profit formats, we employed a one-way, four level,
between-subjects design, manipulating the additional phrase:
(1) The control was no additional information; (2) a minimal
definition, “profit is defined as the sales price minus the cost
paid by Office Warehouse for each printer” (definition con-
dition); (3) a percentage statement about the amount of
profit, “the profit on this item is 40% of the sales price” (40%
condition); and (4) a concrete statement about the amount of
profit, “the profit on this item is $60” ($60 condition). These
conditions represent a continuum of abstraction, culminating
in a statement that provides a direct specification of the dol-
lar value of the profit. As such, this last condition might be
considered a control with which the other conditions can be
compared. That is, whereas the first control enables a com-
parison of how much better a condition fared than the “most
basic/abstract,” the last condition serves as a benchmark for
comparison of how a condition fared relative to the “most
complete/concrete.” Thus, we consider how the other condi-
tions fare in relation to these two.
In the three conditions in which the affirmative disclo-
sures are present, the information is provided immediately
after the “5% of the profit from this product will be donated
to charity” statement and is provided in the same size font
and style. That is, although some participants had examined
the provision of the disclosure information in a footnote
(e.g., Andrews, Netemeyer, and Burton 1998), we present
the information jointly and equivalently with the 5%-of-
profit statement. The dependent variables and procedure
were identical to those in Study 2.
Results
We used three different criteria to test the effectiveness of the
affirmative disclosures (for a breakdown of relevant statistics
by condition, see Table 3). The first criterion is labeled
“donation policy recall criterion” and focuses on the ability
of the affirmative disclosure to enhance the correct recall of
the phrase “5% of profit.” The second criterion, labeled
“reduced systematic error criterion,” examines the ability of
the affirmative disclosure to reduce the number of people
who incorrectly use what would appear to be a 5%-of-price
calculation. This may be investigated on two fronts: (1) the
ability of the affirmative disclosure to reduce the number of
people who make estimates close to the $7.50 level (i.e., 5%
of price) and (2) the ability of the affirmative disclosure to
lower the average (over)estimate of the amount donated rel-
Table 3. Study 5: Evaluation of Estimates by Affirmative Disclosure (AD) Condition
Control Definition Profit Stated as  Profit Stated as
(No AD) AD $ Value AD % Value AD
(n = 37) (n = 35) (n = 32) (n = 33)
Donation Estimate Measures
Mean estimate 7.83 5.77* 4.32* 3.52*
Median estimate 7.50 5.00 3.25 3.00
Standard deviation 1.73 3.30 3.00 1.45
Profit Estimate Measures
Mean estimate 46.60 32.42* 43.67 43.23
Median estimate 50.00 33.34 40.00 40.00
Standard deviation 17.26 13.31 9.77 13.16
Donation Policy Recalled
5% of profits 5.4% 68.6%* 81.3%* 81.8%*
5% of sales price 83.8% 11.4%* 12.5%* 9.1%*
5% but no base 10.8% 2.9% .0% .0%
Other .0% 2.9% 6.3% 3.0%
No response .0% 2.9% .0% 3.0%
Calculated Value Accuracy
Correct estimatea 5.4% 28.6%** 40.6%* 48.5%*
∆ from derived estimate ($) 4.36 3.28 1.06* .27*
Correct recall of priceb 91.9% 94.3% 90.6% 93.9%
Understanding of “profit”c 100.0% 97.1% 100.0% 100.0%
aBased on estimate being within $.50 of derived estimate.
bBased on estimate being within $1.00 of actual.
cDefined by provision of profit estimate that was lower than the retail price.
*p < .001.
**p < .01.
Notes: Comparisons of means (i.e., results reported as a dollar value) were performed with simple t-tests. Comparisons of frequencies (i.e., results reported
as a %) were performed using chi-square analysis. Comparisons reflect the affirmative disclosure condition relative to the control condition. 178 Donation Amounts in Cause-Related Marketing
ative to the control condition. Although these two are related,
the specific measures and statistical analyses differ. The third
criterion, labeled “calculated value accuracy criterion,” con-
centrates on the ability of the affirmative disclosure to
enhance the correct calculation of the estimate. By “correct,”
we mean that the respondents’ donation estimate is accurate
with respect to a calculation of 5% of their estimate of profit
(i.e., the profit estimate multiplied by .05). Thus, for the con-
ditions in which the profit levels are overtly stated, the com-
parison is still made on the basis of derived estimates to pro-
vide a consistent basis for comparison.
In conditions in which profit is either overtly stated as 40%
of the price or specified as $60, participants’ median estimate
for profit was 40% of the price ($60). However, even in these
conditions, only 53.1% of people in the 40% condition and
72.7% in the $60 condition correctly stated the profit level as
$60. Furthermore, although the mean profit estimate for the
40% condition (43.23%) was not significantly different from
the actual value of 40% (t32 = 1.41, n.s.), it was higher in the
$60 condition (43.67%; t31 = 2.12, p < .05).
Donation Policy Recall Criterion
We directly assessed participant recall of the specific word-
ing used to describe the CRM donation as we did in Studies
2 and 3. Using this criterion, we found each affirmative dis-
closure condition to improve correct recall of the phrase
“5% of profit” significantly, relative to the mean recall of
5.4% observed in the control condition (definition condi-
tion: x   = 68.6%, χ2
1 = 31.11, p < .001; 40% condition: x   =
81.8%, χ2
1 = 40.94, p < .001; and $60 condition: x   = 81.3%,
χ2
1 = 41.97, p < .001). However, the three affirmative dis-
closure conditions do not vary in their effectiveness with
this criterion (χ2
2 = 2.88, n.s.).
Reduced Systematic Error Criterion
In Studies 1–3, the most common error observed in the 5%-
of-profits condition was the apparent calculation of the dona-
tion based on 5% of the price rather than an estimation based
on the profit level. Thus, a method of comparing the three
affirmative disclosures is to examine the percentage of partic-
ipants who provided estimates close to $7.50 (i.e., those who
incorrectly calculated 5% of the price). An examination of the
number of people who estimated values within $.50 of this
value (i.e., from $7 to $8) reveals that 89.2% of the control
condition provided estimates in this range. With the affirma-
tive disclosures, this drops to 25.7% in the definition condi-
tion, 9.1% in the 40% condition, and 3.1% in the $60 condi-
tion. Significant differences are observed between the control
condition and the definition condition (χ2
1 = 28.85, p < .001),
the 40% condition (χ2
1 = 43.81, p < .001), and the $60 condi-
tion (χ2
1 = 49.86, p < .001). Compared with the $60 condition,
the definition condition is significantly different (χ2
1 = 6.47,
p < .01), but the 40% condition is not (χ2
1 = .93, n.s.).
When we used a narrower range of $7.49 or $7.50, the
values changed slightly, but the pattern observed is similar,
with values of 67.6%, 14.3%, 6.1%, and 3.1% for each of
the four conditions, respectively. The significant differences
observed for the $.50 range also hold for the $.01 range
specification, with the exception of the difference between
the $60 condition and the definition condition, which is no
longer significant (χ2
1 = .93, n.s.).
Investigating the ability of the affirmative disclosures to
lower the average (over)estimate of the amount donated, we
found a similar pattern to the preceding analysis. An
ANOVA indicates that the four conditions differed in mean
donation estimates (F3, 133 = 20.278, p < .001). The estimate
in the control condition (x   = $7.83) was significantly greater
than the definition condition (x   = $5.77, t70 = 3.34, 
p < .001), the 40%-profit condition (x   = $3.52, t68 = 11.23,
p < .001), and the $60-profit condition (x   = $4.32, t67 = 6.05,
p < .001). The donation estimate was nominally higher in
the definition condition than in the $60 condition, albeit at a
marginal level (t65 = 1.88, p < .10). Although we observed
no difference between the two conditions when the profit
level was provided (t63 = 1.38, n.s.), there was a significant
difference between the definition condition and the 40%
condition (t66 = 3.61, p < .001).
Calculated Value Accuracy Criterion
An ANOVA indicates that the deviation from the calculated
value (i.e., each participant’s estimate of profit multiplied by
5%) also varied across conditions (F3, 132 = 16.61, p < .001).
These values (t-values indicate whether the deviation of the
estimate from the derived estimate differed from zero) were
x   = $4.36, s.d. = 2.41 for the control condition (t36 = 11.01,
p < .001); x   = $3.28, s.d. = 3.34 for the definition condition
(t33 = 5.73, p < .001); x   = $.27, s.d. = 1.72 for the 40% con-
dition (t32 = .91, n.s.); and x   = $1.06, s.d. = 3.21 for the $60
condition (t31 = 1.87, p < .10). With the use of deviation
from calculated values as a criterion, only the 40% condition
acts as a fully effective affirmative disclosure.
To compare the effectiveness of the affirmative disclo-
sures with the two extreme conditions (i.e., the control con-
dition and the $60-profit condition), we performed several
planned contrasts. We observed no significant difference
between the definition condition and the control (t70 = 1.56,
n.s.). However, both the 40% condition (t68 = 8.07, p < .001)
and the $60 condition (t67 = 4.86, p < .001) differed signifi-
cantly from the control. Although the definition condition
differed significantly from the $60 condition (t64 = 2.75, p <
.01), we observed no significant difference between the 40%
condition and the $60 condition (t63 = 1.24, n.s.). Thus, on
this dimension, we found only the 40% and $60 conditions
to be effective affirmative disclosures.
Discussion
Results suggest that all three affirmative disclosure condi-
tions can be effective in reducing error associated with
percentage-of-profit formats. However, the relative effec-
tiveness of the three affirmative disclosures varies with the
evaluative criteria used. The definition affirmative disclosure
appears to be effective with respect to the reduced systematic
error criterion and the donation policy recall criterion.
Indeed, for both measures, the only significant difference
observed between the definition and other affirmative dis-
closures was a lower observed donation estimate in the 40%
condition. However, with respect to the calculated value
accuracy criterion, estimates in the definition condition were
no better than in the control, though the two more onerous
affirmative disclosures were significantly better.
Compared with the control, both the $60 condition and
the 40% condition were effective on all criteria, but only theJournal of Public Policy & Marketing 179
2This refers to how onerous the disclosure would be in terms of reveal-
ing information that would normally remain confidential. It is possible that
the “definition” affirmative disclosure might actually be considered more
onerous in terms of advertising space required.
40% condition was able to reduce the deviation of the esti-
mate from the derived estimate (i.e., 5% of the estimated
profit) to a value that did not significantly differ from zero.
Furthermore, compared with the $60 condition, only the
40% condition resulted in a profit estimate that did not sig-
nificantly differ from the true value. These findings are
notable, given that the 40% condition actually required an
additional computational step to determine the profit level
(i.e., .40 × $149.96); in the $60 condition, the profit level
was explicitly provided. It is possible that the 40% condition
made the required task that much more explicit; nonetheless,
future examination of this issue would be of merit.
Taken together, the criteria for assessing the effectiveness
of the affirmative disclosures suggest that (1) the least oner-
ous criteria, definition, is effective;2 (2) the two more oner-
ous affirmative disclosures, 40% and $60, are generally more
effective than the definition; and (3) disclosing profit as a
percentage (i.e., the 40% condition) may be more effective
than disclosing an absolute amount (i.e., the $60 condition).
General Discussion
This article demonstrates that expressing a CRM donation
as a function of profit results in an upward bias in consumer
estimates of the amount donated. Although part of the bias
is attributable to simple overestimation of profit levels (the
PO effect), the larger issue is that most people fail to con-
sider that profit is a fraction of price (the PEP effect). This
bias cannot be explained by a lack of diligence, the failure
to notice the term “profit,” or an inability to comprehend
what the term means. Rather, it appears that people fail to
integrate their knowledge that profit is a fraction of price
correctly into their estimations. Although similar findings
have been shown previously for calculations (Bar-Hillel
1980; Capon and Kuhn 1982; Casscells, Schoenberger, and
Graboys 1978; Eddy 1982; Hammerton 1973; Tversky and
Kahneman 1982), we know of no prior research that has
demonstrated this result for estimations of any sort.
The overestimation we observed persisted even for those
participants who had formal accounting training (Study 2)
and those who were given a monetary incentive to provide
accurate estimates (Study 3). That the latter group actually
exhibited a stronger PEP effect than any other calls into
question whether some of the respondents given credit for
adjusting their estimates downward in Studies 1 and 2 sim-
ply made a calculation error.
It is possible that the nature of the task used in Study 3
implied a precise answer and that the task unduly encouraged
some participants to use the well-defined information that
was available (i.e., the donation percentage and price). How-
ever, the large PEP effects witnessed in Studies 1 and 2 argue
against a rigid set of circumstances, such as a focus on mon-
etary reward, being necessary for the effect. The results of
Study 4 indicate that PEP effects may obtain without
explicitly asking for a number to be generated. Here, we
found significant differences between 1 and 10%, regardless
of whether it was a percentage of price or profit. However,
we found no difference between price and profit in either the
1% or the 10% condition. Therefore, consumers appear to
ignore the difference between price and profit even when
merely making an assessment. This argues against the neces-
sity of “requesting a number” to obtain confusion between
price and profit. Regardless, further research examining the
specific mental processes used would be worthwhile.
We believe that the first three studies make a strong case
for the confusing nature of percentage-of-profit formats. We
have demonstrated that even in conditions of high knowl-
edge of business terms or high incentive to be accurate,
people produce biased estimates. Although we did not test it
here, it seems reasonable that people who have high busi-
ness knowledge or direct financial incentive are not more
likely than average consumers to make the PEP error. How-
ever, further research could test this assumption formally.
It was unclear whether a large, systematic bias in donation
estimates leads to economic advantage for a firm expressing
its CRM donation as a percentage of profit. To explore this
issue, Study 4 investigated the impact of format on more
proximal measures, such as attitudes and purchase inten-
tions. Although the numerical value (1% versus 10%) had an
impact on these measures, whether the percentage was of
profit or price had no effect. Furthermore, comparison of the
1% of price cell with the numerically equivalent 10% of
profit cell (i.e., both implied a $1.50 donation for a $150
printer) showed a significant positive impact for the
percentage-of-profit format on the measure most proximal to
choice: purchase intention. The goal of this study was to
examine how such CRM campaigns would affect attitudes
toward the retailer as a whole. Further research that examines
attitudes toward the manufacturer would also be of interest.
It should also be noted that the scales we used to assess atti-
tudes were single-item. Further research might consider
multi-item scales to examine the attitudes measured.
Given the Federal Trade Commission policy about decep-
tion, price may be material because of its likely impact on
behavior. Our final study examines ranges of affirmative
disclosures that vary in the burden or limitation on speech
imposed on marketers and demonstrates that several are rea-
sonably effective in reducing the problem of overestimation
in the percentage-of-profit format. The least restrictive
option (from a “freedom of speech” perspective) is to pro-
vide some adequate clarification about what is meant by
“profit.” The most restrictive solution is to ban the use of
this term in advertising when referring to CRM donation
amounts because of the resultant misunderstanding it cre-
ates. If the goal is to draw greater attention to the term
“profit” and to foster some use of profit estimates, the for-
mer may be sufficient. However, if the goal is to provide
information that is unambiguous and not subject to misin-
terpretation or misuse, the latter may be preferable.
Research presented herein examines the confusion that
exists between the terms “price” and “profit.” Because con-
sumers are rarely given explicit information about the
amount (and type) of profit for a given product, additional
ambiguity is present when the donation is premised on profit
rather than price. Because the percentage-of-profit format is
inherently ambiguous, the research we have cited suggests
that percentage-of-profit formats result in decreased atti-
tudes and intentions. We did not find this to be the case.180 Donation Amounts in Cause-Related Marketing
Specifically, in Study 4, we do not observe lower attitudes
and intentions in the percentage-of-profit conditions.
The research presented herein has several limitations.
First, although we took steps to ensure that the product class
used in the experiments was relevant to students, the use of
students serves as a limitation on the ability to generalize to
all facets of society. This having been stated, using univer-
sity students with either accounting training or high motiva-
tion likely presents a strong test of the ability of the general
public to provide an acceptable estimate (i.e., a sample of
the general public is likely to do worse, not better). Second,
the research presented herein was limited to evaluations
made regarding a print advertisement for an ink-jet printer.
Further research might explore estimates for other product
classes in other media formats.
In summary, the research studies presented herein suggest
that in an advertising context, consumers may not make a
distinction between profit and price and tend to use the lat-
ter to develop their donation estimate. Consequently, dona-
tion estimates that are based on a percentage-of-profit for-
mat are generally upwardly biased. This is true even when
incentive or ability to produce unbiased estimates is high.
Although this bias can be somewhat mitigated by applying
affirmative disclosures, none are as effective at reducing this
bias as simply stating the donation as a percentage of price.
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